The Value of Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Insurance to Texas Ranchers by Maisashvili, Aleksandre
  
THE VALUE OF PASTURE, RANGELAND, FORAGE RAINFALL INDEX 
INSURANCE TO TEXAS RANCHERS 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
ALEKSANDRE MAISASHVILI  
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
May 2010 
 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Value of Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Insurance to Texas Ranchers 
Copyright 2010 Aleksandre Maisashvili  
  
THE VALUE OF PASTURE, RANGELAND, FORAGE RAINFALL INDEX 
INSURANCE TO TEXAS RANCHERS 
 
A Thesis 
by 
ALEKSANDRE MAISASHVILI  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  James W. Richardson 
Committee Members, David P. Anderson 
 David A. Bessler 
 Donald R. Fraser 
Head of Department, John P. Nichols 
 
May 2010 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
 iii
ABSTRACT 
 
The Value of Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Insurance to Texas Ranchers. 
(May 2010) 
Aleksandre Maisashvili, B.S., Georgian State Agrarian University; 
M.S., Georgian State Agrarian University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James W. Richardson 
 
            In the beginning of the 2007 crop year, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
(FCIC) launched the Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Pilot Program (PRF-RI) 
for six states. This insurance is an index and not individual insurance. Risk Management 
Agency officials claim that PRF-RI insurance mitigates the risk because index and 
forage production move in the same direction.  Therefore when the index is low there is 
the expectation that production will also be low. PRF-RI is a pilot program and ranchers 
are skeptical as to whether or not it is viable to purchase the insurance.     
            The objective of this research was to determine the economic benefits of rainfall 
insurance in selected counties in Texas and estimate the probability of indemnities under 
different types of coverage levels and index intervals.  
            Historical rainfall indices were simulated for all index intervals and a 
multivariate empirical distribution of rainfall indices were used. The model was run for 
alternative scenarios on the available coverage levels (90%, 85%, 80%, 75%, 70%) and 
relevant premium rates. Each scenario resulted in an estimate of the insurance benefits 
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variable probability density function for a particular coverage level. Stochastic 
Dominance with Respect to a Function (SDRF), Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a 
Function (SERF), and StopLight chart were used to rank the benefits of alternative 
coverage levels.  
            The results indicated that for all regions tested, the best alternative when 
purchasing PRF-RI was to buy the 90% coverage level. Probabilities of earning net 
indemnities decreased at lower coverage levels. December-January is a critical time 
period that should be taken into consideration by the ranchers. The results indicated also 
that insurance returns depend on the region where the policy is purchased. In southern 
and eastern parts of Texas net indemnities appeared to be significantly less and have 
lower probabilities of being positive than in West Texas. Ranchers from West Texas 
may be able to significantly benefit from the insurance.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Overview 
            Droughts and floods cause severe income losses for rural people. Rainfall 
uncertainty has always been a serious challenge for ranchers. Texas is a state that is 
susceptible to droughts in the US and livestock and cattle-breeding has always been one 
of its important businesses. In 2009 drought in Texas led to an estimated $3.6 billion in 
crop and livestock losses and could exceed $4.1 billion (Texas AgriLife Extension 
Service 2009). Hedging against weather risk is a major concern for Texas ranchers. 
In the beginning of the 2007 crop year, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) 
launched Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Pilot Program (PRF-RI) for six 
states. These states include counties in: Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, and Texas. Different from the traditional crop insurance program, PRF-
RI is based on rainfall index. 
            Using a rainfall index, within a specific area and certain time period indemnity 
payments are calculated as a function of shortfall from normal precipitation. Rainfall 
indices are obtained from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
for approximately a 12 x 12 mile grid in each insurable county.  
 
 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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Ranchers are required to select at least two, two-month time periods in which 
precipitation is important during the growth and production of the local grazingland 
species (Risk Management Agency 2009a). In 2008 and 2009, 11,962 insurance policies 
were sold in Texas; 5,254 and 6,708, respectively (Risk Management Agency 2009b). 
            The program has many advantages, it is flexible, provides timely indemnities, 
production records are not required, and, finally, moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems are minimized. The last two advantages of PRF-RI are main drawbacks for 
traditional crop insurance. The main disadvantage of PRF-RI is basis risk, which means 
that individual losses and experiences are not covered since the indemnity payment is 
based on an area grid index. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
            The problem is that PRF-RI is a pilot program and ranchers are skeptical whether 
it is viable to purchase insurance or not. Six index intervals, different types of coverage 
levels and productivity factors make the program complicated for individual ranchers to 
make the right decision. Personal experience alone may not be enough to judge if PRF-
RI is worthwhile for Texas ranchers. Precipitation in Texas decreases as we move from 
East Texas towards West Texas; however it does not necessarily mean that insuring 
ranchers in the western counties is always beneficial.  
 
 
 3
1.3 Objective 
          The objective of this research is to determine the economic benefits of rainfall 
insurance in selected counties in Texas and estimate the probability of indemnities under 
different types of coverage levels and index intervals.  Monte Carlo simulation will be 
applied to calculate stochastic payouts for different scenarios. Several types of risk 
ranking methodologies will be used to rank insurance options for risk-averse ranchers. 
The results should help ranchers make better decisions regarding PRF-RI. The research 
will be useful for educational, as well as for decision making purposes. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 The Program Overview 
            A Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Insurance (PRF-RI) pilot program 
was developed by Risk Management Agency in 2007. This insurance program for 
pasture, rangeland or forage based on a rainfall index is available in 18 states. This 
section aims to provide information on the mechanics of the program, clarify the 
terminology used and provide an example of how the program works. 
            Different from traditional crop insurance programs, PRF-RI is based on overall 
lack of precipitation in a certain region, so individual losses are not indemnified. Losses 
are calculated on regional grid levels using the rainfall index. The rainfall index is based 
on National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data and uses an 
approximate 12x12 mile grid. RMA officials claim that this small grid size allows for 
closer correlation to individual experience. As a result, there is a possibility that the grid 
will cross county and state lines. According to RMA, this new program offers maximum 
flexibility for ranchers, as it allows them to insure only those areas that are important to 
their pasture program or hay operation (Risk Management Agency 2009a).  
            When a producer decides to purchase PRF-RI insurance, there are several steps 
that need to be processed. The first step for the rancher is to identify the grid in which 
the grazingland is located. Local insurance companies help ranchers to determine those 
grids after they provide the exact location of the land. If the contiguous acreage is 
located, for example, in three grids the acreage can be separated into two or three grids, 
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or left all in one grid. Therefore, acreage cannot be insured in more than one grid.  
            The next step for the rancher is to decide which index intervals need to be 
insured. The crop year is divided into six, two-month index intervals. The crop year 
starts in February; therefore, the first index interval contains February-March and the 
sixth contains December-January. The insured is required to select at least two index 
intervals, assuming production per year is influenced by rainfall in more than one 
interval. Each index interval is determined separately; indemnities payable on one 
interval are not dependent on results from other intervals. The maximum percentage of 
grazingland a producer is allowed to insure in each index interval varies by state. In 
Texas, the maximum percentage for one index interval is 50 percent and the minimum is 
10 percent of total insured acres, with the sum of all the percentages (crop type, Grid ID, 
index interval) equaling 100 percent of the insured acreage selected for each grid ID by 
crop type (Risk Management Agency 2009b).  
            Once a rancher decides which index intervals to insure, he or she must choose the 
appropriate coverage level and productivity factor to determine the dollar amount of 
protection per acre. The following factors must be included in the rancher’s decision: 
 
 A productivity factor is a percentage factor selected by the insured producer 
that allows them to individualize their coverage based on the productivity of the 
grazingland or hayland they operate. The percentage value is between 60 and 150 
percent (Risk Management Agency 2009a). The productivity of graizngland is 
determined subjectively by the rancher. If the producer thinks that his 
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grazingland is an average as productive as other ranchers’ pastures in the same 
county, he could choose 100 percent. 
 A coverage level ranges between 70 and 90 percent, is simply the percentage of 
loss against which the producer desires to be covered.   
 A county base value is an established production value of grazingland and 
hayland; every county has a unique land value.   
 So the dollar amount of protection per acre equals the product of the county 
base value, by the Productivity Factor (60% -150%) and the Coverage Level 
(70% -90%), as illustrated in Table 2.1 below: 
 
                 
        
 The premium rate is applied to each unit and equals the product of the dollar 
amount of protection per acre, the number of insured acres, the premium rate, 
and the adjustment factor. In addition, the government offers a premium rate 
subsidy depending on coverage level chosen. The higher the coverage level, the 
lower the subsidy. As illustrated in Table 2.2, the adjustment factor has a fixed 
value in every state and is given as 0.01. At 85 percent coverage level, the 
Table 2.1.  Calculation of the Dollar Amount of Protection Per Acre
County Base Value Productivity Factor Coverage Level
Dollar Amount of 
Protection Per Acre
(1) (2) (3) (1x2x3)
$17.65 1.2 0.85 $18.00 
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applicable subsidy is 55 percent; hence the producer has to pay 45 percent of the 
total premium per acre.   
 
  
 
 The Trigger Grid Index is calculated by multiplying the selected coverage level 
by the Expected Grid Index (based on historical mean accumulated precipitation 
by index interval, expressed as a percentage; expected grid index = 100). 
 The Final Grid Index is based on current accumulated precipitation data for 
each index interval. For example, if current data represents a 30% reduction, then 
the final grid index will be 70.  
 
2.2 Example 
            A hypothetical rancher decided to insure 500 acres of pasture. The producer may 
select any coverage level between 70 and 90 percent.  Let’s assume that the rancher 
chose 85 percent. Using the same principle, the productivity factor ranges between 60 
and 150 percent and it depends on the producer, since the value is based on the 
productivity of the land that every rancher subjectively chooses depending on his/her 
own discretion. Let’s assume the producer selected 120 percent productivity factor with 
Table 2.2.  Calculation of the Producer Premium Rate Per Acre
Dollar 
Amount of Premium Rate Adjustment Factor
Cost to Producer 
Net of Subsidy
Producer Premium 
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1x2x3x4)
$18.00 $26.00 0.01 0.45 $2.10 
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a county base value of $17.65. The dollar amount of protection per acre would be $18, as 
illustrated in Table 2.1. 
            Assume that that the rancher chose the first and second index intervals and he 
decided to insure 50 percent of total grazingland in each index interval, because he 
knows that the minimum and maximum amount to be insured is 10 percent and 50 
percent respectively. If we assume that the rancher insured totally 500 acres and chose 
the first and second index intervals, the insured acres in each index interval will be 250 
acres. 
            If we combine the values that we determined, we are able to calculate the total 
policy protection. As illustrated in Table 2.3, it is simply the product of dollar amount of 
protection per acre, insured acres, and share: 
 
  
  
 
Table 2.3.  Calculation of the Total Policy Protection
Index Interval
Dollar Amount of 
Protection Per Acre Insured Acres Share Policy Protection
(1) (2) (3) (1x2x3)
I   $18 250 1 $4,500 
II  $18 250 1 $4,500 
III
IV
V
VI
Total Policy Protection 500 $9,000 
Note: Index Interval I is the beginning of the crop year and stands for February-March; Index 
Interval VI is the end of the crop year and stands for December-January.
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            The hypothetical rancher finds out that the premium rates in index interval I and 
II are $12 and $14 respectively. The applicable subsidy on the 85% coverage level is 
55%. Given this information, we can determine the total producer premium rate, which 
is the product of policy protection, the premium rate, the adjustment factor and one 
minus the government subsidy. Table 2.4 demonstrates the calculation of the total 
producer premium rate.  
 
 
 
            Once the final grid index is determined, indemnities will be due only if the final 
grid index is below the trigger grid index. Suppose that for Interval I, the final grid index 
is 120, which is above the trigger grid index, in this case no indemnity is due. On the 
other hand, let’s assume that the final grid index for interval II is 60, which is below the 
trigger grid index.  
            The indemnity is calculated by multiplying the payment calculation factor by the 
total policy protection for the relevant index interval. The payment calculation factor is 
Table 2.4.  Calculation of the Total Producer Premium Rate
Index Interval Policy Protection Premium Rate Adjustment Factor
Cost to Producer 
Net of Subsidy
Producer 
Premium Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1x2x3x4)
I $4,500 $12 0.01 0.45 $243 
II $4,500 $14 0.01 0.45 $283.50 
III
IV
V
VI
Total $9,000.00 $526.50 
Note: Index Interval I is the beginning of the crop year and stands for February-March; Index Interval VI is  
the end of the crop year and stands for December-January.
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calculated by subtracting the FGI from the TGI trigger grid index and dividing by the 
TGI:             Payment Calculation Factor = (Trigger Grid Index-Final Grid Index)
Trigger Grid Index
=  (85-60)
85
 = 0.294 
  
 
             
            As we see in Table 2.5, the payment calculation ratio for the first index interval is 
not applicable. Since the trigger grid index in the first index interval is less than the final 
grid index. The total amount of indemnity is $1323, which is generated from the second 
index interval.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5.  Calculation of the Indemnity Payment
Index Interval Premium Paid Policy Protection
Payment Calculation  
Factor Indemnity
I $243 $4,500 N/A N/A
II $283.50 $4,500 0.294 1,323
III
IV
V
VI
Total $526.50 $9,000 $1,323 
Note: Index Interval I is the beginning of the crop year and stands for February-March; 
Index Interval VI is the end of the crop year and stands for December-January.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
            Bhattacharya and Osgood (2008) examined potential effects of index insurance 
for ranchers on animal stocking decisions and possible environmental effects on long-
run pasture sustainability. They suggested that index insurance based on weather is one 
of the tools to deal with climate risk and enhance the returns from livestock; however it 
might have undesired negative effects.  They discuss the behavior of individual ranchers 
as they make ex-ante animal stocking decisions to meet a minimum return (necessary for 
loan repayment or consumption).  Their analysis used a constrained optimization model 
based on minimum stocking requirements. They reviewed three possible scenarios and 
came up with the following results:  1) If income is non-binding, the stocking decision 
and pasture quality will not be affected by the introduction of insurance.  2) When 
income is binding two scenarios were analyzed: In the case of low rainfall, insurance 
promotes ranchers to make higher ex-ante stocking decisions and run more animals than 
optimal. Naturally, insurance would have an adverse effect on the pasture quality and its 
overall long-term sustainability. If income is binding in high rainfall areas, pasture will 
be better utilized and insurance will be beneficial only in the short term, however it 
might cause harmful long run effects. Their paper concluded that insurance encourages 
ranchers to make suboptimal decisions at the beginning of the season, which not only 
jeopardizes their income, but affects the pasture quality in the long run, as well as leads 
to overstocking.    
            Hazell (2001) reported the advantages and shortcomings of weather index based 
 12
insurance in developing countries. Hazell suggested that index based insurance has 
positive attributes if it can meet the following requirements: it is affordable to all rural 
people, it can reimburse catastrophic income losses and protect consumption or debt 
repayment ability; rainfall insurance is very practical and can be freely implemented 
even if there is limited data available, rain index insurance circumvents moral hazard 
problem that typical insurance programs face, and it requires less monitoring to control 
adverse selection. Hazell mentions two major pitfalls of area based insurance:               
1) individuals can suffer a loss and not receive an indemnity if the actual rainfall index 
remains above the trigger point. This is called basis risk and significant risks are faced 
by the insurer. 2) When an indemnity is to be paid, all of the insured ranchers in an area 
must be reimbursed at the same time, so the insurer faces the prospect of having to make 
enormous payments.      
            Müller, Quaas, Baumgärtner, and Frank (2007) investigated how the access to 
rainfall insurance affects the grazing strategy of a farmer. A case study was investigated 
on a Gamis Farm in Namibia that is successful in ecological and economic terms located 
in the district Maltahohe. They applied a safety-first rule as the decision criteria. 
Precipitation was simulated stochastically and a right skewed distribution was observed, 
where events of low rainfall are frequent, however time to time high rainfall events 
occurred. Average annual net income was simulated, average income and standard 
deviation were calculated too. The paper revealed that farmers’ optimal strategy is 
highly dependent on their time horizon. Farmers with a short-time horizon who require 
high minimum income and are more risk averse do not rest pastures, no resting means 
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using the pasture with fully stocked livestock to generate the highest expected value of 
average income. Hence pastures become less sustainable and insurance would accelerate 
the over use of pastures.   With a long-time horizon, insurance can play a positive role on 
pasture sustainability. The study showed that, in dry years the minimal income 
requirement can be reached despite resting a part of the grazing land, because an 
indemnity payment is available for the farmer. Therefore, in the long run it is highly 
likely that higher productivity of the pasture will be maintained.   
            Cole, Tobacman, and Topolova (2007) presented results from large-scale 
randomized field experiments that offered weather insurance for farmers in over 50 
villages in India. The authors discuss the factors affecting decisions for purchasing 
rainfall insurance. Wealth appeared to be a significant factor in the decision process. 
Education was important variable too; educated farmers were 12% more likely to 
purchase insurance. Risk aversion is another predictor for the insurance purchase 
decision; risk-averse households were more likely to purchase insurance. Demand for 
insurance appeared to be very elastic with respect to the premium price.   
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4. THEORY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
            Section 4 represents the economic theory used to model decision making under 
risk from which the rainfall insurance model is based. To accurately determine the most 
appropriate insurance type, coverage level and index intervals with an assumed level of 
risk preference, an appropriate economic framework must be utilized. The purpose of 
this section is to set up and explain this framework. The first section defines the concept 
of risk and outlines the various sources of risk that influence the rainfall insurance 
decision. Section two explains utility theory, upon which the methods for ranking risky 
alternative choices is based. Section three explains the three major levels of risk 
preference. In the final two sections, the theory behind the specific risk ranking methods 
of CEs stochastic efficiency and StopLight chart is explained.  
 
4.2 Concept of Risk 
            In the real world the results of most decisions are associated with risk. 
Agricultural production is typically a risky business and decisions are made in an 
environment highly characterized by risk and uncertainty. In a risky environment, there 
are many uncertain variables at play when making a decision. Usually, it is difficult for 
the producer to make a decision when faced with several alternatives and, therefore, it 
gets complicated for them to accurately determine which is the correct choice. 
            There are many definitions of risk in agricultural economic analysis.  
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Hardaker et al. (2004a) describe risk as undertaking any action involving uncertain 
consequences. Risk is an imperfect knowledge where the probabilities of the possible 
outcomes are known. Risk is the part of a business decision, the manager cannot control 
(Richardson 2008).  Uncertainty, however exists when these probabilities are not known. 
Lien (2001) provides two additional interpretations of risk: the chances of bad outcomes 
and the variability of outcomes. Uncertainty is not analogous or equivalent to risk. 
Uncertainty, unlike risk, cannot be portrayed by a probability distribution.  A risky 
decision is one for which there is no single sure outcome and forces beyond the farmer’s 
control affect and determine the probability of the outcome.  
            Hardaker et al. (2004a) define six specific types of risk observed in agricultural 
production. Production risk comes from the unpredictable nature of weather and 
uncertainty about the performance of crops, livestock and pasture. Moreover, production 
risk also includes the fact that prices of farm inputs and outputs are seldom known for 
certain when production decision must be made. Price risk include risks that come from 
unpredictable supply and demand changes and currency exchange rates. Institutional risk 
is a risk that the government usually brings on with the introduction of various rules and 
policies. Within institutional risk is sub-categories of political risk (risk of unfavorable 
policy changes), sovereign risk (risk that foreign governments will fail to uphold 
commitments such as trade agreements), and relationship risk (risk steaming from issues 
between business partners or other trading organizations). Human/personal risk is a risk 
that develops within those operating the farm. Crises such as death and/or divorce of 
those operating the farm may threaten the existence of the operation. If one of the 
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owners becomes seriously ill, production could be lost or significantly altered, which 
may in turn reduce returns. Losses in this category may also be a result of carelessness 
by the farmer or farm workers in using inputs such as machinery or handling livestock. 
Business risk is the combination of production, market, institutional, and personal risk. 
This type of risk affects the business independent of how it is financed. Business risk 
impacts the farm business performance in terms of the net cash flow generated or net 
farm income earned. Financial risk results from the method used to finance the farm. 
There is risk when the farm uses borrowed funds to provide some of the capital for the 
operation of the farm. In this case, some of the operating profit must be allocated 
towards meeting the interest charges on the borrowed funds. Similarly, financial risk 
exists when: funds are borrowed and interest rates unexpectedly rise, the loan is called-
off by the lender, and there is a limited or lack of availability of loan finance when 
required by the farm.  
            Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (1997) also 
includes 3 external sources of risk in agricultural production.  Natural environment risk 
is a risk from short-term weather conditions (drought, flood, frost, and storms) and long-
term climate factors (climate change leading to increased variability from issues such as 
the Greenhouse Effect). Natural hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, wildfires, and 
ever-changing incidences of pests and diseases are also included as sources of natural 
environment risk. These risk factors directly impact yields, which further indirectly 
impact prices through a change in supply. Economic environment risks come from 
uncertainty about market demand and supply which in turn influences prices of inputs 
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and outputs, inflation and interest rates which affect long-term planning, and 
productivity resulting from the availability for new technology. Social environment risks 
are risks that occur over the long-term, as the availability and competence of farm labor 
is affected by changes in lifestyle and education. Other social events, such as war, are 
included in this type of risk as they could also severely impact a farm production.  
 
4.3 Risk Aversion 
            Weather is the main risk in rainfall insurance. Weather is unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. Excess amounts or lack of precipitation could reduce the pasture quality. 
            Individuals’ approaches toward risk influence many of the decisions they make. 
There are three types commonly used to characterize a decision makers’ attitude toward 
risk. An individual is typically characterized as being either risk averse, risk neutral, or 
risk preferring (Nicholson and Snyder 2008)1. An individual who is risk averse usually 
prefers a level of income that is certain compared to a risky income that has the same 
expected value. That individual has a diminishing marginal utility of income or wealth. 
One who is risk averse can be described by their willingness to pay a certain amount of 
wealth to avoid the risk involved in a gamble (Nicholson and Snyder 2008). Similarly, 
the greater the variability of income, the more the person would be willing to pay to 
avoid the risky situation.  
 
 
 
____________ 
1We only analyzed risk neutral and risk averse individuals; however the research by Halter (1978) showed 
that some ranchers appeared risk takers. 
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In agriculture, it is assumed that the majority of farmers are risk averse (Hardaker, 
Hurine, and Anderson 1997). For example, farmers are willing to buy production 
insurance, adopt farming systems that are more diversified and pay less attention to 
decisions that are based solely on profit. For an individual who is risk averse, losses are 
weighted more heavily than gains. When a decision maker exhibits a risk neutral attitude 
they are defined as being indifferent between a level of income that is certain and an 
uncertain income with the same expected value. If the individual shows a preference for 
risk or a “risk loving” attitude, they prefer an uncertain income to a level of income that 
is certain, no matter if the expected value of the uncertain income is less than that of the 
certain income. 
            The general assumption of risk aversion is that more money is preferred to less 
which is illustrated mathematically by:   
(1)         U(1)(w)>0,                                                                                                                    
where U(௜)(w) is the i-th derivative of the utility function U and w represents wealth. If 
the first derivative of the utility function is positive, then it is the case that the decision 
maker prefers more to less (Nicholson and Snyder 2008). Similarly, if the second 
derivative of the utility function is negative, this implies that the decision maker is risk 
averse. If the second derivative of the utility function is equal to zero the decision maker 
is assumed to be risk neutral and if it is positive they are characterized as having a risk 
preferring attitude (Nicholson and Snyder 2008). 
            The farmers’ level of risk preference is an important factor in any decision 
analysis. Risk averse behavior by agricultural producers not only affects the decisions 
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they make but also further impacts society: if a farmer is risk averse, they may avoid the 
efficient allocation of farm resources (Hardaker et al. 2004a). For instance, if a farmer 
has an aversion to risk, they may be slow to adopt new and improved but untried 
technologies. Farmers might wait until significant time passes before they actually 
decide to try more advanced and improved technologies (Pride and Ferrell 2008). All 
economic models that include risk are more solid and robust because they provide a 
better prediction of an individual producer’s behavior.  
            Among three types of risks decision makers can be defined risk averse, risk 
neutral, or risk loving. Moreover, individuals can also be classified based on their degree 
of risk preference. For example, two decision makers may both be risk averse but one 
may be more risk averse than other. The degree of a person’s risk aversion depends on 
the nature of the risk and on the person’s wealth. One method to find out the degree of 
risk aversion is to measure the curvature of an individual’s utility function (Hardaker et 
al. 2004a). Since the utility function is described only up to a positive linear 
transformation, measuring risk aversion using the decision maker’s utility function can 
be fairly difficult to accomplish. Therefore, a measure needs to be used that is constant 
for a positive linear transformation.   
            Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) developed a more simplistic means for estimating 
the degree of risk aversion given the fact that the utility function is only defined up to a 
positive linear transformation. Meyer(1977) clarifies that the degree of risk aversion can 
be measured by the coefficient Ra(w) or equivalently the absolute risk aversion function 
represented by equation (2): 
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(2)         Ra(w)= ିU''(w)U'(w)                                                                                                                   
Within equation (2), it is implied that the absolute risk aversion coefficient will decrease 
as the level of wealth increases. This is because it is assumed that individuals are more 
willing to take on risk as their level of wealth increases. This equation demonstrates the 
negative ratio of the second and first derivatives of the utility of wealth (U(w)) function. 
If the resulting sign of equation (2) is positive, it is implied that the decision maker 
prefers risk, and zero value indicates a risk neutral attitude. In addition, the resulting 
coefficient obtained from equation (2) measures the curvature of the utility function and 
is not affected by any positive linear transformation. Adding a constant will also have no 
impact on the numerator or the denominator. The numerator and/or denominator will 
only be affected when they are multiplied by a constant but regardless their ratio will 
remain the same.  
            The absolute risk aversion function, Rr (w), merely provides a local measure of 
risk aversion. Therefore, at different levels of wealth, the degree of risk aversion will 
vary (Hardaker et al. 2004a). Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) provided three different 
classifications as to how the degree of risk aversion varies with increasing levels of 
wealth. A utility function will display either constant, increasing, or decreasing absolute 
risk aversion over some domain of wealth if and only if, over the interval, Ra(w) remains 
constant, increases, decreases with an increase in wealth (Jehle and Reny 2001). The 
first classification, decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), imposes the restriction 
that the decision maker is less averse to taking small risks at higher levels wealth (Jehle 
and Reny 2001). The second case, Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) states that 
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the decision maker does not have a change in their willingness to accept a gamble at 
higher levels of wealth. In this second case, preferences are unchanged if a constant 
amount is added to or subtracted from all payoffs (Hardaker et al. 2004a). In addition 
preferences among risky prospects are unchanged for all payoffs (Hardaker et al. 2004a). 
In addition preferences among risky prospects are unchanged if all payoffs are 
multiplied by a positive constant. The final classification, Increasing Absolute Risk 
Aversion (IARA) describes the case where the more wealth the decision maker has, the 
more averse they become to accepting the small gamble.  
            When there is no information available regarding the decision maker’s exact risk 
preference or level of risk aversion an assumption must be made. Arrow (1965) 
suggested using the relative risk aversion coefficient, Ra (w), to define risk preference 
and a value of 1.0 as the most common attitude toward risk.   The constant relative risk 
aversion function for Rr (w) = 1, which is the “everyone’s utility function” stated by 
Daniel Bernoulli (1738). However in 1992, Anderson and Dillon found that this was too 
strong of an assumption and they proposed a scale for classifying the degree of risk 
aversion which is based on the magnitude of the relative risk aversion coefficient.   
Table 4.1 presents the classifications of risk aversion proposed by Anderson and Dillon 
(1992). 
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            If from the classification above, a value for Rr (w) can be established that is 
assumed to be more or less constant for a local variation in wealth then a value of Ra (w) 
can be derived using equation (3): 
(3)       Ra (w) = Rr (w)w                                                                                                       
            Hardaker et al. (2004a) suggest that the choice of the exact form of the utility 
function is rarely important in decision analysis provided the degree of risk aversion is 
consistently represented. Therefore, if the risk aversion coefficients are derived using the 
classification represented in Table 4, then they can be used with reasonable confidence 
in almost any utility function.  
 
4.4 Expected Utility 
            When an individual faces a decision and involves risky consequences, a 
framework should be developed in a way that the various alternatives can be compared. 
This framework is termed Decision Analysis Under Risk. When an individual faces a 
decision that is not certain, the probability distributions for each of the risky alternatives 
must be made for decision making (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker 1977). Utility 
Table 4.1.  Classification of Risk Aversion
Rr (w) Degree of Risk Aversion
0.0 Risk Neutral
0.5 Hardly Risk Averse
1.0 Somewhat Risk Averse
2.0 Rather Risk Averse
3.0 Very Risk Averse
4.0 Extremely Risk Averse
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theory plays a significant role in decision making under risk.  When making a choice 
among risky alternatives, an individual is expected to select the alterative that provides 
the highest expected utility (Nicholson and Snyder 2008).   
            The central theorem of utility analysis is known as Bernoulli’s principle or the 
expected utility theorem. As far back as 1738, Daniel Bernoulli wrote about Subjective 
Expected Utility (SEU) hypothesis, which states that in order to assess risky alternatives 
the decision makers’ utility function for any given outcome is required (Hardaker et al. 
2004b). The expected utility theory is the most commonly used framework for analyzing 
decision making under risk. Decision analysis is often complicated by the fact that for a 
single risky choice different individuals will have varying attitudes toward the level of 
risk represented by the decision. However, Hardaker et al. (2004b) state that the SEU 
hypothesis continues to be the most suitable theory for the assessment of risky choices. 
The SEU hypothesis is based on four principle axioms (Hardaker et al. 2004a). The first 
axiom, completeness, implies that a person either prefers one of two risky prospects (a1 
and a2) or is indifferent between them. The second axiom, transitivity, follows from 
ordering but expands to include additional risky prospects, thus a1, a2, and a3. Transitivity 
states that if a person prefers a1 to a2 (or is indifferent between them) and prefers a2 to a3 
(or is at the same time indifferent between them), then this same individual will either be 
indifferent between or prefer a1 to a3. The third axiom, continuity, infers that if an 
individual is faced with a risky prospect involving both a good and bad outcome, this 
individual will take the risk only if the chance of getting the bad outcome is low enough. 
This axiom can also be explained by saying, if an individual prefers a1 to a2 to a3 then a 
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subjective probability P (a1) exists that is not zero or one. Further, a probability exists 
where this individual is indifferent between a2 and a lottery yielding a1 with a probability 
P (a1) and a3 with a probability 1 – P (a1). Lastly, the independence axiom states that the 
preference between a1 and a2 is independent of a3. That is, if a1 is preferred to a2, and a3 
is separate risky prospect, then a lottery with a1 and a3 as outcomes will be preferred to a 
lottery with a2 and a3 as outcomes when  
P (a1) = P (a2).  
            The SEU hypothesis (Bernoulli’s principle) can be established based on these 
four axioms. These axioms measure both preference and subjective probability 
(Hardaker et al. 2004a). If a decision makers’ preferences are consistent with these four 
axioms, a utility function, U, can be established for that decision maker which associates 
a single utility value U (aj) with any risky prospect. In turn, the utility function has three 
basic properties. First, utilities can be used to rank risky alternatives. Therefore the 
alternative with the highest utility can be assumed to be the preferred option. This is 
represented by stating: 
            if a1 is preferred to a2 then U (a1) > U (a2). 
Secondly, the utility of a risky prospect is in fact the decision maker’s expected utility 
for that prospect. This can also be defined by equation (5):  
(5)         U (aj) = ∑i  U (aj | Si) P (Si).                                                                                                    
Here the expected value is calculated from the utility values of the consequences 
weighted by the corresponding subjective probabilities. Lastly, the utility function is 
only defined up to a positive linear transformation. In other words it has an arbitrary 
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origin and scale.  
            The SEU hypothesis is important as it unities the three foundations of decision 
making under risk (FAO 1997). Decision analysis is based on the SEU theory because 
the chances of bad versus good outcomes can only be evaluated and compared if the 
decision maker’s relative preferences for such outcomes are known (Hardaker et al. 
2004b). The SEU hypothesis states that the decision maker’s utility function for these 
outcomes is needed to assess risky alternatives because the shape of the utility function 
is what defines the decision maker’s attitude toward risk. The FAO (1997), further states 
that the SEU hypothesis is significant in decision analysis as it brings together three 
important elements of risky decision making. These three elements include: the decision 
maker’s personal preferences about possible outcomes, the decision maker’s personal 
degrees of belief in the occurrence of these possible outcomes, and the decision maker’s 
personal responsibility and accountability for whatever decision is taken. Since the 
expected utility theorem brings together these aspects of decision making, it allows for 
risky prospects to be ranked in order of preference. The risky prospect with the highest 
expected utility is determined to be the most preferred choice.  
            In agricultural economic studies such as this rainfall insurance model, where 
there are alternative risky decisions and an assumed utility function, the SEU hypothesis 
is valuable as it states that the level of utility can be calculated depending on the degree 
of risk aversion (r) and the stochastic outcome of the output variable x. This is computed 
using equation: 
(6)        U (x,r) = ∫U (x,r) f (x)dx .                                                                                                  
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Following this computation, U is calculated for selected values of r in the range of r1 to 
r2. In addition, CEs can be established for every value of U by applying equation: 
(7)         CE (x,r) = U-1 (x,r).                                                                                                               
 
4.5 Certainty Equivalents 
            Using the SEU theory, the concept of CEs can be inferred. When decision 
analysis is based on financial outcomes it is useful to compare CEs with the expected 
value of the risky prospect to determine the risk attitude of the decision maker (Hardaker 
et al. 2004a). When a decision maker is faced with a decision with risky payoffs, there is 
a sum of money for sure that would make the decision maker indifferent between 
whether taking the risk or accepting the sure sum of money. This sure sum of money is 
referred to as the CE. The CE is the lowest price for which the decision maker would be 
willing to sell a desirable risky prospect or equivalently, the highest amount that the 
decision maker would be willing to pay to get rid of an undesirable risky prospect. For 
the same risky alternative, the CE can vary between individuals because, in general, 
people have different attitudes toward risk. Figure 4.1 is used to provide a graphical 
representation that can be used to explain an individual’s attitude toward risk.  
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Figure 4.1. Individual’s attitude towards risk. Adapted from: Nicholson and Snyder 2008 
 
            In the figure above, W* represents an individual’s current wealth and U (W) is a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index that reflects how he or she feels about various 
levels of wealth. In the figure, U (W) is drawn as a concave function of W to reflect the 
assumption of a diminishing marginal utility. It is assumed that earning extra money 
receives less enjoyment as total wealth increases. For example, if a risk averse individual 
is offered two fair gambles: a 50-50 chance of winning or losing $h of a 50-50 chance of 
winning or losing $2h. The utility of present wealth is U(W*). The expected utility if he 
or she participates in gamble 1 is given by   Uh (W*): 
            Uh (W*) = 1
2 
 U ൫W*+h൯+ 1
2 
 U ൫W*-h൯,    
and the expected utility of gamble 2 is given by  U2h (W*): 
           U2h (W*) = 1
2 
 U ൫W*+2h൯+ 1
2 
 U ൫W*-2h൯.      
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It is geometrically clear that: 
            U (W*) > Uh (W*) > U2h (W*) 
We can conclude that , this risk averse person will prefer his or her current wealth to that 
wealth combined with a fair gamble and will prefer a small gamble to a large one. The 
reason for this is that winning a fair bet adds to enjoyment less than losing hurts 
(Nicholson and Snyder 2008).  As a matter of fact, this person might be willing to pay 
some amount to avoid participating in any gamble at all. We can notice that, a certain 
wealth of ഥܹ provides the same utility as does participating in gamble 1.This person 
would be willing to pay W*-Wഥ  in order to avoid participating in the gamble. This 
explains why people buy insurance. They are giving up a small, certain amount (the 
insurance premium) to avoid the risky outcome they are being insured against 
(Nicholson and Snyder 2008).  
 
4.6 Efficiency Criteria 
            In applied agricultural economic research, risk is generally represented by a 
probability distribution. Risk assessment requires coming to grips with both probabilities 
and preferences for outcomes held by the decision maker (Hardaker et al. 2004a). The 
probability distributions associated with various risky choices are often quantitatively 
compared using methods of stochastic efficiency. These methods are highly accepted as 
means of evaluating risky alternatives, as they only require two assumptions regarding a 
decision makers’ preference for risk (FAO 1997). These assumptions include the 
decision makers’ level of risk aversion and the associated functional form of the utility 
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function.  
            If a decision makers’ utility function is unknown or unavailable, efficiency 
criteria is very helpful as it allows researchers to rank risky alternatives (Hardaker et al. 
2004a). Although SEU hypothesis had been criticized because hypothesis is not 
consistent with the theory in certain risky choice situations (e.g., Allais 1984), Hardaker 
et al. (2004b), argue that the SEU hypothesis remains the most appropriate theory for 
prescriptive assessment of risky choices. In order to avoid the need to elicit a specific 
single-valued utility function, stochastic dominance and efficiency criteria have been 
developed. There is an important trade-off to be made in conducting a stochastic 
dominance analysis. When fewer restrictions are placed on the utility function, the 
results will be more applicable, but the criterion in selecting between alternatives will be 
less powerful.  
            First-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) has the fewest restrictive preference 
assumptions of all stochastic dominance methods. As stochastic dominance goes further 
into Second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD), third-degree stochastic dominance 
(TSD), SDRF, and SERF, more restrictive preference assumptions are imposed 
(Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker 1977).  FSD  has an assumption that more wealth is 
preferred to less and have absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth, ra(w), between 
the bounds -∞ < ra(w) < +∞ (King and Robison 1984).          
            Following FSD, SSD is the next most discriminating efficiency method. The 
SSD adds the assumption that the decision maker has an aversion to risk.  In terms of the 
utility function over the range of [a, b], the basic assumption surrounding SSD is that the 
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utility function is monotonically increasing and strictly concave, or equivalently  
U1(x) > 0 and U2(x) < 0, where U1(x) and U2(x) are the first and second derivatives of 
the utility function. The absolute risk aversion bounds are 0 < ra (w) < +∞. 
            TSD has an additional assumption, which infers that the third derivative of the 
utility function is positive, U3(x) > 0. This assumption implies that as individuals 
become wealthier they become less risk averse. 
            SDRF and SERF are used more frequently to rank risky decisions in applied 
research, as they have stronger discriminatory power than FSD, SSD, TSD.  For SDRF 
the absolute risk aversion bounds are reduced to rL(w) ≤ ra (w) ≤ rU (w), and ranking of 
risky scenarios is defined for all decision makers whose absolute risk aversion function 
lies anywhere between lower and upper bounds  rL(w) and rU (w), respectively (Hardaker 
et al. 2004a). SDRF uses a pairwise comparison between alternatives to discover 
whether one alternative dominates another. SDRF also requires assumptions to be made 
regarding the form of decision makers’ utility function. Usually the negative exponential 
utility function is assumed for convenience. Moreover, when using SDRF one can 
expect that pairwise SDRF may not isolate the smallest possible efficient set (Hardaker 
et al. 2004a). SDRF establishes an efficient set by only selecting the alternatives that are 
dominated in a pairwise comparison (Hardaker et al. 2004b).  
            SERF is arguably more transparent in application than SDRF and offers a more 
simplistic method of ranking risky alternatives. SERF method selects the efficient 
options, as it simultaneously compares all possible alternatives to each other. The SERF 
sets a specific range of risk preferences and ranks each preference with a utility efficient 
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alternative. The SERF compares all alternatives based on certainty equivalents (CEs) for 
a specific range of risk preference. Moreover, when there is no information available 
about the decision makers’ preferences, the SERF method can be used for that situation. 
Like SDRF, the SERF also requires an assumption regarding the specific form of the 
utility function and relevant measure of risk aversion (Hardaker et al. 2004a). There are 
several possible utility functions for the SERF: power utility function, the logarithmic 
utility function, and the negative exponential utility function. When dealing with SDRF 
method, it might depend on the choice of a utility function. SERF can be applied for any 
utility function as long as the inverse function can be calculated. However, it is 
suggested that the SERF will yield the best result when CARA function is adopted or 
equivalently a negative exponential function (Hardaker et al. 2004b).  CARA has one 
main advantage, the coefficients of absolute risk aversion can be applied to 
consequences measured in terms of wealth or income (Anderson and Hardaker 2003).  
 
4.7 StopLight Chart   
            The StopLight table develops the probability ranking tables. The StopLight chart 
summarizes the probabilities that the scenarios will be less than the lower target value 
(in red) and the probabilities that the risky alternatives will exceed a maximum target 
value (in green). The probability of each scenario falling between the two targets is 
reported in the table in yellow (Richardson 2008). StopLight facilitates the ranking of 
scenarios by providing a table of the probabilities as well as graphically showing the 
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probabilities of each range. The StopLight chart is simpler for those decision makers’ 
who are not trained in the use of SERF and stochastic dominance.      
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5. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
5.1 Simulation 
            In the literature review section, four major studies have been reviewed that 
addressed weather risk. In all four studies a simulation method was a critical component 
of the research. The reason is that a simulation is the best method that can be used in the 
research to truly incorporate thoroughness and feasibility of a particular risky action. A 
simulation has many advantages that support this argument: A deterministic model uses 
single-point estimates. Each random variable in the model is assigned a “best guess” 
estimate. Several alternatives of each input variable are manually chosen (such as best 
case, worst case), and the results recorded for each so-called “what if” scenario. 
However, Monte Carlo simulation uses random sampling of probability distribution 
functions as model inputs; simulation produces hundreds of possible outcomes instead of 
a few discrete scenarios. The results provide probabilities of different outcomes 
occurring. The results show not only what could happen, but how likely each outcome is. 
Simulation makes creating graphs easy for different outcomes and the corresponding 
chances of occurrence. This is a crucial component for communicating findings to the 
decision makers.  
            If simulation is compared with mathematical programming, mathematical 
programming models are simulations in some cases. They can represent the 
mathematical relationships necessary to describe an economic or business system. 
However, they seldom incorporate risk, they solve for the optimal answer and give the 
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normative answer of what ought to be. Simulation models, on the other hand, 
incorporate risk and answer the positive question of what is the likely outcome 
(Richardson 2009). To conclude the description of simulation it is defined as the process 
of solving a mathematical simulation model representing an economic system for a set of 
exogenous variables (Richardson 2008). A simulation model is solved a large number of 
times to statistically represent all possible combinations of the random variables in the 
system. Therefore, the results of simulation are a large number of key output variables 
(KOVs) of interest to the decision makers. The values of simulated model represent an 
empirical estimate of the stochastic distribution for a random variable, thus the risk is 
incorporated with variable.  
 
5.2 Distributions 
            In agriculture, making a decision based only on highest net return without 
considering a risk is unrealistic. Agriculture is a risky environment and each alternative 
of net return is represented by a distribution.  
            There are two broad categories of probability distributions: parametric and 
nonparametric. Common parametric distributions include the uniform and normal 
distribution. Nonparametric distributions include the discrete uniform and empirical 
distribution. Those distributions are applied to variables for which the information 
available regarding their distribution is unknown. In other words, those distributions 
allow the data to define the shape of the distribution.  
            Probability distributions are also known as univariate or multivariate. Univariate 
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distributions have one variable while multivariate distributions refer more than one 
random variable. In most cases variables are correlated to each other, multivariate 
distributions are the rule in economic analysis models (Richardson et al. 2000).  
            If two random variables are correlated and their correlation is ignored in 
simulation, the model will either over or under state the risk, hence the results of the 
simulation will be biased.  Rainfall indices in each index interval are correlated, 
therefore to capture the historical correlation among the rainfall indices from different 
index intervals, the probability distributions associated with these random variables are 
estimated as multivariate empirical probability distributions.  
 
5.3 Data 
            The PRF-RI is based on almost 50 years of data from NOAA. The historical 
index values are available for 12x12 mile grids. Index intervals and sample year are 
stated as the percent of normal. Information on rainfall indices, PRF-RI premium rates 
and government subsidies for each insurable county are available on the RMA website 
(http://prfri-rma-map.tamu.edu/default.aspx).       
 
5.4 Model Development 
            The first part of the research is the input data which are historical rainfall indices 
starting in year 1948. The data includes six two-month index intervals for selected 
counties in Texas. The first step of the model is to simulate the historical rainfall indices 
for all index intervals. A multivariate empirical distribution of rainfall indices will be 
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used for the following reasons: 1) Empirical distribution allows the data to define the 
shape of distribution and it avoids forcing a specific distribution on the variables. 2) The 
empirical distribution can be simulated multivariate to capture the historical correlation 
between index intervals. 3) Multivariate empirical distribution is closed form distribution 
and it eliminates the possibility of the simulated values exceeding values observed in 
history (Ribera, Hons, and Richardson 2004), hence negative rainfall indices will not be 
observed.    
            Validation is the second step of the model development. Validation is the process 
used to ensure that the historical rainfall indices are simulated correctly and the 
simulated indices demonstrate the appropriate properties of the parent distribution. 
Cumulative distribution function (CDF) and Probability distribution function (PDF) will 
be developed from the simulated values and compare to the historical data to ensure that 
they have the same shape throughout the range of the data. The 2-Sample Hotelling  
T-Squared multivariate test will be used to statistically test if the collective means of a 
multivariate random sample are generated from the same distribution as the historical 
distribution. The complete homogeneity test will be used to compare mean vector and 
the covariance matrix for the simulated values simultaneously to their corresponding 
values in the historical data series. Student’s t-test will be used to validate if the 
correlation coefficients between the simulated variables and the assumed correlation 
matrix are statistically equal.  
            Verification is the process of verifying that all of the equations in the model 
appropriately calculate what they are supposed to calculate. The mathematical accuracy 
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of the equations will be checked separately. All equations will be checked to ensure that 
the correct variables are included and multiplied by the appropriate coefficients and 
added or subtracted correctly.  
            Choosing which two 2-months index intervals are most appropriate to be insured 
is a complex process. One of the solutions to this problem is to develop a portfolio 
analysis. All combinations of two 2-month index intervals will be simulated separately 
and two types of risk ranking methods will be applied to rank which two index intervals 
are the most viable. Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function, Stochastic 
Efficiency with Respect to a Function, and StopLight chart will be used to rank the 
alternative pairs of indices.  
            Scenario analysis is an alternative strategy or policy action. Each scenario in a 
simulation is unique because it is based on a different set of assumptions for the 
exogenous variables. The model will be simulated for 500 iterations to estimate the 
parameters for the benefit function assuming that coverage level is 90 percent associated 
with its premium rate. The 500 iteration simulation for this pair of values consisted of 
one scenario for the model and one value for the PDF of the benefit variable. The model 
will also be run for alternative scenarios on the remaining coverage levels (85%, 80%, 
75%, 70%) and relevant premium rates. Therefore each scenario results in an estimate of 
the insurance benefits variable PDF for a particular coverage level. 
            How will it address the objective of the problem?  The study is not to develop or 
predict anything or make decisions whether the insurance in particular county is viable 
or not. The purpose of this model is to estimate distributions of the insurance payoffs for 
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alternative options so the decision maker can make a better decision. Every rancher 
makes a rational decision based on past experience and personal discretion.  This study 
aims to answer the question: will ranchers make a better decision having used this study 
or not? Applied simulation model will answer many questions that ranchers might face 
now.  
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6. RESULTS 
 
6.1 South San Antonio, Bexar County, TX Grid ID 39650 
            Rainfall index data is given from 1948 through 2008 and is divided by index 
intervals I through VI. The first index interval includes February-March and sixth 
includes December-January. A multivariate empirical distribution was applied to the 
data; six index intervals were simulated and the simulated, stochastic variables for 500 
iterations were analyzed. Table 6.1 shows the summary statistics for the simulated data 
over the six index intervals.  
 
 
             
            The model was validated to ensure the random variables were simulated properly 
and to demonstrate the properties of their parent distributions. Several tests were 
performed to validate random input variables. Specifically, “Hotelling’s T-Squared Test” 
was used to test whether the simulated vector of means for the multivariate distribution 
is equal to the vector of means for the original distribution. The Hotteling’s T-Squared 
Index Intervals I II III IV V VI
Mean 99.19 98.99 99.14 100.22 98.42 98.74
StDev 56.88 51.54 69.51 56.66 66.19 82.56
CV 57.35 52.07 70.12 56.53 67.25 83.61
Min 2.50 9.89 13.99 17.19 2.79 5.79
Max 320.20 250.21 320.62 250.51 285.02 540.04
Table 6.1. Summary Statistics for the Six Index Intervals for South Bexar 
County Grid ID 39650  
Note: Index Interval I is the beginning of the crop year and stands for February-March; Index 
Interval VI is the end of the crop year and stands for December-January.
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Test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the vector of means is equal to the vector of 
means for the random variables. In other words, the simulated means were found to be 
statistically equal to the input data mean. A Correlation test was performed using a 
Student’s t-test to determine if the historical correlation matrix used to simulate the 
multivariate distribution is appropriately reproduced by the simulated variables. None of 
the correlation coefficients for any two simulated variables were statistically different 
from the historical correlation coefficient at the 99 percent level.  
            The model was also validated by visually inspecting the minimum and maximum 
random values to ensure that they are reasonable given the assumed means. Also, the 
minimum and maximum fractional deviates in the empirical probability distributions 
were validated visually to ensure they are practical. While these tests are non-statistical, 
they help to ensure that the coefficient of variation, minimum, and maximum of the 
simulated values are equal to the historical data.  
            The next step is to calculate the net returns per acre for each index interval. In 
South San Antonio, the county base value, the premium rate and the applicable 
government subsidy are given by RMA. A productivity factor of 120 and a coverage 
level of 70 percent were chosen for simplicity. Again these choices are completely up to 
the rancher, and he/she subjectively chooses based on his/her subjective expectations.   
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The net returns for each index interval were calculated using the same principle that had 
been applied in the hypothetical example.2 
            After we generated the stochastic benefits per acre for the six index intervals, the 
next step was to conduct the portfolio analysis. The rancher must insure the pasture in at 
least two index intervals. For simplicity, we generated the payoffs for two index 
intervals. If we take into account all possibilities of six index intervals and the rancher 
decides to select two index intervals, there are a total of fifteen possible combinations. 
Table 6.2 shows the portfolio combinations given two index intervals selected at a time.  
 
____________ 
2Given any combinations of coverage levels and productivity factors, it would not change the final 
outcome. As for combination we chose 70 percent of coverage level and 120 percent of a productivity 
factor. 
Feb-Mar Apr-May June-July Aug-Sep Oct-Nov Dec-Jan
Portfolio 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0
Portfolio 2 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0
Portfolio 3 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0
Portfolio 4 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0
Portfolio 5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5
Portfolio 6 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
Portfolio 7 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0
Portfolio 8 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0
Portfolio 9 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5
Portfolio 10 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0
Portfolio 11 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0
Portfolio 12 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5
Portfolio 13 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0
Portfolio 14 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5
Portfolio 15 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
Table 6.2. Fifteen Possible Combinations of Index Intervals for 50% Coverage of 
Two Intervals at a Time Used as Portfolios for Picking the Best Combination of 
Intervals 
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For the fifteen possible combinations the net return is simulated per acre using the 
stochastic rainfall index values. Each index interval is insured for 0.5 acre. The results 
for simulating net benefits for the fifteen portfolios are summarized in Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.3. Summary Statistics for Comparing Fifteen Portfolios of Index Intervals for South Bexar 
County Grid ID 39650 
 
 
Portfolio fifteen, 50% V and 50% VI had the highest mean followed by portfolio three.  
Figure 6.1 shows the SERF rankings for the simulated portfolios.  
 
 
P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 P 8 P 9 P 10 P 11 P 12 P 13 P 14 P 15
Mean ($/acre) 0.95 1.06 0.82 1.18 1.08 1.08 0.84 1.20 1.10 0.96 1.32 1.22 1.08 0.98 1.33
StDev ($/acre) 2.27 2.18 1.93 2.48 2.42 2.21 1.93 2.58 2.46 2.02 2.65 2.31 2.58 2.36 2.84
CV (%) 239.89 205.51 235.25 209.81 223.72 204.14 228.42 215.05 223.56 210.24 201.10 189.49 239.97 241.21 212.52
Min ($/acre) -0.81 -0.95 -0.79 -0.98 -0.92 -0.91 -0.75 -0.94 -0.88 -0.89 -1.08 -1.02 -0.92 -0.86 -1.04
Max ($/acre) 9.84 9.01 9.36 9.89 10.76 9.83 8.45 11.59 10.05 7.94 10.69 10.28 8.95 9.24 10.76
Note: P stands for Portfolio. 
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Figure 6.1. SERF ranking of fifteen portfolios for determining the best index intervals for a risk 
averse decision maker in South Bexar County Grid ID 39650 
 
 
The fifteenth portfolio - the fifth and sixth index intervals - ranked as the most preferred 
assuming a negative exponential utility function across risk intervals for a risk neutral to 
an extremely risk averse producer.3 Initially this might suggest that the rancher should 
have picked corresponding index intervals during the spring time when the rainfall is 
critical for pasture; but the portfolio fifteen is winter when the grass is not growing. 
Implying that, they want to maximize returns of insurance indirect to ranch operations.  
Next the decision maker must choose the appropriate coverage level. The higher the 
coverage level, the higher the premium rate and the lower the government subsidy. Five  
 
____________ 
3Maximum ARAC was calculated by division of half of the pasture land value in Texas into 4.0 which 
represents the relative risk aversion coefficient for an extremely risk averse decision maker. 
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scenarios were analyzed for coverage levels between 70% and 90%. Each coverage level 
has a unique premium rate and an applicable government subsidy rate. The net return 
simply equals the sum of indemnity payments in the fifth and sixth index intervals, less 
the premium rate. The net return was simulated for five alternative insurance coverage 
levels, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, and 90% using the stochastic index values for the fifth and 
sixth index intervals.    
            Table 6.4 and Figure 6.2 confirm the summary statistics and the CDF chart of the 
five insurance scenarios respectively. Note that in the first scenario, where the coverage 
level is 70%, the maximum amount that the rancher can lose is $1.04 per acre  
(Table 6.4). The maximum net indemnity per acre the rancher can receive under the 70% 
coverage level is $10.76, which is less than the other alternative coverage levels. At the 
higher coverage levels, the premiums (minimum per acre) increases and the maximum 
net return increases. The summary statistics show that insurance level that is calculated 
for the 90% coverage level, has the possibility of losing $2.26 per acre and gaining as 
much as $13.48 per acre. The CDF chart shows that insurance scenario at 90% has the 
lowest left and the highest right tails (Figure 6.2). In other words, the higher the 
coverage level, the higher the possibility to earn indemnities. 
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Figure 6.2. Cumulative distribution functions of per acre net returns for five insurance levels using 
portfolio index intervals for ranchers in South Bexar County Grid ID 39650 
 
 
            In Figure 6.3, the StopLight chart summarizes the probabilities that the outcomes 
for the insurance scenarios will be less than a lower target and the probabilities that the 
risky alternatives’ outcomes will exceed a maximum target (Richardson 2008).  
Table 6.4.  Summary Statistics of Net Returns Per Acre from Simulating Five Insurance Levels 
Using Portfolios for Ranchers in South Bexar County Grid ID 39650
Insurance 70% Insurance 75% Insurance 80% Insurance 85% Insurance 90%
Mean ($/acre) 1.33 1.56 1.67 1.91 1.98
StDev ($/acre) 2.84 3.11 3.39 3.66 3.92
CV (%) 212.52 199.13 203.47 191.83 197.44
Min ($/acre) -1.04 -1.23 -1.57 -1.81 -2.26
Max ($/acre) 10.76 11.56 12.20 12.95 13.48
Note: Net Return = Indemnity - Premium.  
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Figure 6.3. StopLight chart summarizing the probabilities of net returns to range insurance for 
ranchers in South Bexar County Grid ID 39650. Red light shows the probabilities that net return 
falls below zero; the yellow areas show the probabilities that the net return for an insurance level 
will fall between 0 and $1.54 per acre; and the green area shows the probabilities that the net return 
will be greater than $1.54 per acre 
 
 
The StopLight chart shows the probabilities of each range, which is very helpful in 
ranking risky alternatives for a decision maker not trained in the use of SERF and 
stochastic dominance. The red area shows us the probabilities that the benefit falls below 
zero; the yellow areas show the probabilities that the net benefit for an insurance level 
will fall between 0 and $1.54 per acre; and the green area shows the probability that the 
net benefit will be greater than $1.54.  A risk averse decision maker is expected to select 
the insurance policy that has the lowest probability that the overall benefit falls below 
zero. Based on the probabilities of target values, we can see that if the 90 percent 
coverage level policy is chosen, there is a 41 percent chance that the net benefit will fall 
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below zero and a 59 percent chance that the rancher will receive indemnity payments 
that exceed the premium. If the rancher decides to choose the 70 percent coverage level, 
the probability that the producer will not get any indemnities or that the payment will be 
less than the premium paid is 50%. Similarly, we can compare other alternative coverage 
levels and their respective probabilities. Based on the StopLight results, the decision 
maker is expected to insure the pasture using the fifth and sixth index intervals and 
choose the 90 percent coverage level.  
            Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the SERF and the SDRF ranking methods applied to 
the simulated data for the insurance coverage level scenarios respectively. Both utility - 
based rankings systems ranked insurance policy 5 — the 90 percent coverage level — as 
the most preferred. 
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Figure 6.4. SERF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in South Bexar County  
Grid ID 39650 for risk averse decision makers  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.5. SDRF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in South Bexar County  
Grid ID 39650 for risk averse decision makers 
  
 
Lower RAC 0 Upper RAC 0.00147
Name Level of Preference Name Level of Preference
1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred 1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred
2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred 2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred
3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred 3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred
4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred 4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred
5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred 5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred
Note: RAC stands for Risk Aversion Coefficient and SDRF for Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function.
Efficient Set Based on SDRF at Efficient Set Based on SDRF at
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             The same analysis was applied to three other locations — Robstown, Henrietta 
and Andrews. The results of that analysis follow in sections 6.2 - 6.4.         
 
6.2 Robstown, Nueces County, TX Grid ID 41580 
Validation  
            The simulated rainfall indices for Robstown were validated in the same way as in 
the previous case to ensure that they were simulated properly. The Hotteling’s  
T-Squared test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the simulated means were 
statistically equal to the input data means. According to the Student’s t-test, none of the 
correlation coefficients for any two simulated variables were statistically different from 
the historical correlation coefficients at the 99 percent level.  
            The model was also validated by visually checking coefficient of variation, the 
minimum and maximum random values to ensure that they are reasonable given the 
assumed means. Also, the minimum and maximum fractional deviates in the empirical 
probability distributions were validated visually to ensure they are realistic.  
 
Portfolio Analysis 
            The county base value, the premium rate and the applicable government subsidy 
are given by RMA. As in the previous case, a productivity factor of 120 and a coverage 
level of 70 percent were chosen. 
            The fifteen possible combinations of the 6 intervals were analyzed and net return 
was simulated per acre for each portfolio. Each index interval is insured for 0.5 acre. The 
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results for simulating net returns for the fifteen portfolios are summarized in  
Table 6.5. Portfolio five, 50% I and 50% VI had the highest mean followed by portfolio 
fifteen. 
 
Table 6.5. Summary Statistics for Comparing Fifteen Portfolios of Index Intervals for Nueces 
County Grid ID 41580 
 
             
            Figure 6.6 shows the SERF rankings for the simulated portfolios. The fifth 
portfolio — the first and sixth index intervals — was ranked as the most preferred 
assuming a negative exponential utility function across risk intervals for a risk neutral to 
an extremely risk averse producer.  
 
P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 P 8 P 9 P 10 P 11 P 12 P 13 P 14 P 15
Mean ($/acre) 0.75 0.79 0.69 0.84 0.94 0.64 0.54 0.69 0.79 0.58 0.72 0.82 0.63 0.73 0.87
StDev ($/acre) 1.81 1.78 1.55 1.85 1.94 1.70 1.27 1.64 1.76 1.45 1.64 1.74 1.49 1.52 1.83
CV (%) 242.79 226.95 223.91 221.48 207.47 267.79 234.05 239.19 223.90 249.00 226.84 211.00 236.17 208.11 208.93
Min ($/acre) -0.71 -0.77 -0.62 -0.73 -0.77 -0.70 -0.55 -0.66 -0.70 -0.60 -0.71 -0.75 -0.56 -0.60 -0.71
Max ($/acre) 7.01 6.75 6.29 7.08 7.27 7.67 4.99 8.30 7.05 6.26 7.45 7.18 5.87 5.89 7.26
Note: P stands for Portfolio. 
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Figure 6.6. SERF ranking of fifteen portfolios for determining the best index intervals for a risk 
averse decision maker in Nueces County Grid ID 41580 
 
 
 
 
Benefits 
            After finding out that the first and sixth index intervals are the driest four months, 
five insurance scenarios — with their respective premium rates and applicable subsidies 
for coverage levels between 70% and 90% — were analyzed using the stochastic index 
values for the first and sixth index intervals. As mentioned above, the higher the 
coverage level the higher the premium rate and the lower the government subsidy. The 
net return was simulated for five alternative coverage levels using the stochastic rainfall 
index values.   
            Table 6.6 and Figure 6.7 show the summary statistics and the CDF chart of net 
returns for the five insurance scenarios, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90% for the fifth and 
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sixth index intervals.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Cumulative distribution functions of per acre net returns for five insurance levels using 
portfolio index intervals in Nueces County Grid ID 41580 
 
 
 
 
Note that in the first insurance policy where, the coverage level is 70%, the maximum 
amount that the rancher can lose is $0.77 per acre (Table 6.6). The maximum positive 
Insurance 70% Insurance 75% Insurance 80% Insurance 85% Insurance 90%
Mean ($/acre) 0.94 1.08 1.16 1.33 1.38
StDev ($/acre) 1.94 2.15 2.36 2.56 2.77
CV (%) 207.47 198.51 203.59 192.69 201.08
Min ($/acre) -0.77 -0.90 -1.14 -1.31 -1.62
Max ($/acre) 7.27 7.81 8.25 8.75 9.12
Table 6.6. Summary Statistics of Net Returns Per Acre from Simulating Five Insurance 
Levels Using Portfolios for Ranchers in Nueces County Grid ID 41580
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net indemnity per acre the rancher can receive under the 70% coverage level is $7.27, 
which is considerably less than one observed in South San Antonio at the 70% coverage 
level. The reason is that the minimum precipitation observed in South San Antonio is 
much lower than one observed in Robstown. The summary statistics show that insurance 
policy 5, which is calculated for the 90% coverage level, has the possibility of losing 
$1.61 per acre and gaining as much as $9.12 per acre. The CDF chart shows the 
insurance policy 5 has the lowest left and the highest right tails (Figure 6.7). 
            In Figure 6.8, the StopLight chart is summarized. As mentioned above, the 
StopLight chart is very helpful in ranking risky alternatives for a decision maker not 
trained in the use of SERF and stochastic dominance. 
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Figure 6.8. StopLight chart summarizing the probabilities of net returns to range insurance for 
ranchers in Nueces County Grid ID 41580. Red light shows the probabilities that net return falls 
below zero; the yellow areas show the probabilities that the net return for an insurance level will fall 
between 0 and $1.11 per acre; and the green area shows the probabilities that the net return will be 
greater than $1.11 per acre  
 
 
The red area shows us the probabilities that the net return falls below zero; the yellow 
areas show the probabilities that the net return will fall between 0 and $1.11 per acre; 
and the green area shows the probability that the net benefit will be greater than $1.11. 
The decision maker is expected to select the insurance scenario that has the lowest 
probability that the overall net benefit falls below zero. Based on the probabilities of 
target values, we can see that if 90 percent coverage level is chosen, there is a 40 percent 
chance that the net return falls below zero and a 60 percent chance that the rancher will 
receive indemnity payments that will exceed the premium. If the rancher decides to 
 55
choose the 70 percent insurance coverage level, the probability that the producer will not 
get any positive net indemnities or that the payment will be less than the premium paid is 
47%. Similarly we can compare other alternative insurance policies and their respective 
probabilities. Based on the StopLight results, the decision maker is expected to insure 
the pasture in the first and sixth index intervals and choose the 90 percent coverage 
level.  
            Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the SERF and the SDRF ranking methods applied to 
the simulated data for the five types of insurance policy scenarios. Both utility based 
rankings systems ranked insurance policy 5 – the 90 percent coverage level — as the 
most preferred one. 
 
 
Figure 6.9. SERF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in Nueces County 
Grid ID 41580 
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Figure 6.10. SDRF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in Nueces County  
Grid ID 41580 
 
 
            If we compare these final two study regions, some interesting results can be 
noticed. Robstown is drier than South San Antonio. The probability of receiving net 
positive indemnities in Robstown is slightly higher than in South San Antonio. However, 
since the county base value in Nueces County is significantly lower than in Bexar 
County and at the same time premium rates in Robstown are higher than in South San 
Antonio, which precludes earning a higher amount of indemnities than in South San 
Antonio.  Both regions share the sixth interval as one of the most preferred one.  
 
6.3 Henrietta, Clay County, TX Grid ID 33873 
            Henrietta in Clay County is the third region for the model. So far, we have 
discussed two regions located basically in the southern part of Texas, whereas Henrietta 
is located on the north side of the state. Based on that, the results of the study might be 
more or less different than the other two areas. 
 
Lower RAC 0 Upper RAC 0.00147
Name Level of Preference Name Level of Preference
1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred 1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred
2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred 2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred
3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred 3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred
4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred 4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred
5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred 5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred
Note: RAC stands for Risk Aversion Coefficient and SDRF for Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function.
Efficient Set Based on SDRF at Efficient Set Based on SDRF at
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Validation 
            The simulated rainfall indices were validated to ensure that they were simulated 
properly. The Hotteling’s T-Squared test failed to reject the null hypothesis and the 
simulated means were found to be statistically equal to the input means. Using a 
Student’s t-test, a Correlation test was performed and none of the correlation coefficients 
for any two simulated variables were statistically different from the historical correlation 
coefficient at the 99 percent level. 
            The benefits per acre were calculated for each index interval. Given the county 
base value, the premium rate and the applicable government subsidy, a productivity 
factor of 120 and a coverage level of 70 percent were tested fixed for simplicity.  
 
Portfolio Analysis  
            The portfolio analysis was conducted and the payoffs per acre were generated for 
two index intervals.  The results of all fifteen combinations for two index intervals with 
0.5 acre in each are summarized in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7. Summary Statistics for Comparing Fifteen Portfolios of Index Intervals for Clay County 
Grid ID 33873 
 
 
P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 P 8 P 9 P 10 P 11 P 12 P 13 P 14 P 15
Mean ($/acre) 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.57 0.62
StDev ($/acre) 1.02 1.04 1.23 1.23 1.28 0.99 1.12 1.14 1.21 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.37 1.38 1.46
CV (%) 318.90 293.94 309.76 276.63 257.01 280.12 282.03 255.16 243.20 284.65 252.22 224.08 261.28 240.67 234.19
Min ($/acre) -0.36 -0.43 -0.49 -0.51 -0.49 -0.34 -0.40 -0.42 -0.40 -0.48 -0.50 -0.48 -0.55 -0.53 -0.55
Max ($/acre) 5.35 4.85 5.94 5.51 6.02 4.84 4.67 5.85 4.91 5.42 5.97 6.19 5.43 5.56 5.24
Note: P stands for Portfolio.
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Figure 6.11 shows that, portfolio fifteen has been ranked as the most preferred 
alternative — 50% V and 50% VI — assuming a negative exponential utility function, 
which has the highest mean, followed by portfolio 14 – 50% IV and 50% VI; and by 
portfolio 12 – 50% III and 50% VI.  
 
 
Figure 6.11. SERF ranking of fifteen portfolios for determining the best index intervals for a risk 
averse decision maker in Clay County Grid ID 33873 
 
 
 
 
As we see, all three top ranked portfolios have the sixth index interval in common. 
Implying that, 6th index interval is the most critical time period that should be taken into 
consideration by the ranchers.  
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Benefits 
            Five insurance scenarios were analyzed for coverage levels between 70% and 
90% using the fifth and sixth index intervals. For each scenario the net return of 
insurance policy was calculated and simulated using the stochastic rainfall index values. 
Those results are summarized in Table 6.8. We observe that the maximum payoffs per 
acre for each coverage levels are relatively lower than results in previous cases. The 
maximum net return per acre that might be received at 90% coverage level is 
significantly lower than the maximum benefit that can be earned in South San Antonio 
and in Robstown at the 70% insurance coverage level. This result can be linked to one 
main factor: the county base value in Henrietta is significantly lower than county base 
values in South San Antonio and in Robstown. The maximum amount of loses at the 
70% insurance coverage level is $0.55 per acre and the highest net indemnity that can be 
earned on the same policy level is $5.24 per acre. As expected, at higher insurance 
coverage levels payoffs increase. At 90% coverage level the largest amount that can be 
lost is $1.17 per acre. While the possibility of earning the maximum net payoffs is as 
much as $6.91 per acre. 
 
         
 
 
Insurance 70% Insurance 75% Insurance 80% Insurance 85% Insurance 90%
Mean ($/acre) 0.62 0.74 0.79 0.93 0.98
StDev ($/acre) 1.46 1.63 1.79 1.95 2.11
CV (%) 234.19 220.30 226.37 209.80 214.32
Min ($/acre) -0.55 -0.64 -0.82 -0.94 -1.17
Max ($/acre) 5.24 5.72 6.12 6.57 6.91
Table 6.8. Summary Statistics of Net Returns Per Acre from Simulating Five Insurance Levels 
Using Portfolios for Ranchers in Clay County Grid ID 33873
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Figure 6.12 illustrates the CDF chart of net returns for five insurance scenarios. As in 
previous studies, the insurance policy at 90% has the lowest left and the highest right 
tails.  
 
 
Figure 6.12. Cumulative distribution functions of per acre net returns for five insurance levels using 
portfolio index intervals for ranchers in Clay County Grid ID 33873 
 
 
             
            The StopLight chart is summarized in Figure 6.13. The red area shows the 
probabilities that the net benefit falls below zero; the yellow area shows the probabilities 
that the net benefit will fall between 0 and $0.74 per acre; and the green area shows the 
probability that the net benefit will be greater than $0.74. At the 85% and 90% insurance 
coverage levels, there are respectively 46% and 45% probabilities of not receiving any 
indemnities or indemnities that are less than $0.74/acre. Practically there is no difference 
between the 85% and 90% coverage levels and the decision maker might be indifferent 
between these two coverage levels. Similarly there is very small difference between the 
payoff probabilities for the70% and 75% insurance coverage levels. The probabilities of 
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not earning any net indemnities or receiving indemnities that are less than the premium 
paid is 51% and 50%, respectively. For the 70% and 75% insurance coverage levels the 
decision maker usually is expected to select the insurance policy that has the lowest 
probability that the overall benefit falls below zero, but since the difference between 
85% and 90% insurance coverage levels is very small, the choice for different risk 
averse individuals becomes more subjective.    
 
 
 
Figure 6.13. StopLight chart summarizing the probabilities of net returns to range insurance for 
ranchers in Clay County Grid ID 33873. Red light shows the probabilities that net return falls below 
zero; the yellow areas show the probabilities that the net return for an insurance level will fall 
between 0 and $0.74 per acre; and the green area shows the probabilities that the net return will be 
greater than $0.74 per acre 
 
 
            Figures 6.14 and 6.15 show the SERF and the SDRF ranking methods applied to 
the simulated data for the insurance coverage level scenarios. Both utility based rankings 
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systems ranked insurance policy 5 — the 90 percent coverage level — as the most 
preferred one. 
 
 
Figure 6.14. SERF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in Clay County  
Grid ID 33873 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15. SDRF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in Clay County  
Grid ID 33873 
 
Lower RAC 0 Upper RAC 0.00147
Name Level of Preference Name Level of Preference
1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred 1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred
2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred 2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred
3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred 3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred
4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred 4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred
5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred 5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred
Note: RAC stands for Risk Aversion Coefficient and SDRF for Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function.
Efficient Set Based on SDRF at Efficient Set Based on SDRF at
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6.4 Andrews, Andrews County, TX, Grid ID 35781 
            The last area that was studied is Andrews, located in the extreme western part of 
the state. The rainfall map of Texas shows that, this part of the state is much drier 
compared to the other areas. Thus, calibrating one of the areas for this part of the state is 
interesting to see whether there will be a significant difference in net returns.   
 
Validation 
            The Hotteling’s T-Squared test failed to reject the null hypothesis, hence the 
simulated means were found to be statistically the equal to the input data means. None of 
the correlation coefficients for any two simulated variables were statistically different 
from the historical correlation coefficients at the 99 percent level.  
            The net returns per acre were simulated for each index interval. Given the county 
base value, the premium rate and the applicable government subsidy, a productivity 
factor of 120 and a coverage level of 70 percent were used simplicity.  
 
Portfolio Analysis  
            The portfolio analysis was conducted and the payoffs per acre were generated for 
two index intervals.  Table 6.9 shows us the summary statistics for all fifteen 
combinations simulated for two index intervals with 0.5 acre in each.  
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Table 6.9. Summary Statistics for Comparing Fifteen Portfolios of Index Intervals for Andrews 
County Grid ID 35781 
 
 
Figure 6.16 illustrates from the SERF ranking that portfolio five is the most preferred 
alternative  — 50% Dec, Jan and 50% Feb, Mar — assuming negative exponential utility 
function. It has the highest mean, followed by portfolio 15 – 50% V and 50 VI; and by 
portfolio 4 – 50% I and 50% V.  
 
 
Figure 6.16. SERF ranking of fifteen portfolios for determining the best index intervals for a risk 
averse decision maker in Andrews County Grid ID 35781 
 
 
 
 
 
P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 P 8 P 9 P 10 P 11 P 12 P 13 P 14 P 15
Mean ($/acre) 0.65 0.53 0.62 0.80 0.91 0.34 0.43 0.61 0.72 0.31 0.49 0.60 0.58 0.69 0.87
StDev ($/acre) 1.28 1.14 1.20 1.47 1.54 0.96 1.05 1.22 1.27 0.93 1.10 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.52
CV (%) 196.30 214.80 191.76 183.30 168.50 282.35 241.61 198.72 176.05 300.10 224.82 208.38 223.62 194.88 173.75
Min ($/acre) -0.57 -0.51 -0.58 -0.72 -0.76 -0.35 -0.42 -0.56 -0.61 -0.36 -0.50 -0.54 -0.56 -0.61 -0.75
Max ($/acre) 4.87 4.27 5.23 5.08 5.26 4.31 4.24 5.15 4.88 4.26 4.54 4.66 4.76 5.08 5.26
Note: P stands for Portfolio.
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Benefits 
            Using the first and sixth index intervals, five insurance scenarios were analyzed 
for coverage levels between 70% and 90%.  Insurance policies were simulated for the 
five alternative insurance coverage levels using the stochastic rainfall index values and 
the results are summarizes in Table 6.10.  
 
 
The range of net benefit loss is relatively smaller than in South San Antonio and 
Robstown and similar to Henrietta. Since this area is considered to be drier than the 
regions that we have already discussed, the premium rates for Andrews are much higher 
than in the other areas. The probabilities of earning net indemnities are significantly 
higher than in the other three areas due in part to the higher premiums. The maximum 
level amount of losing at the 70% insurance coverage level is 0.76$ per acre and the 
highest net indemnity that can be earned for the same insurance coverage level is $5.26 
per acre. As expected, at higher coverage levels the net payoffs increase. The summary 
statistics show that at the 90% insurance coverage level the largest amount that can be 
lost is $1.45 per acre and the maximum net indemnity that can be earned is $6.34 per 
acre. 
            In Figure 6.17, the StopLight chart summarizes the net returns of five insurance 
Table 6.10. Summary Statistics of Net Returns Per Acre from Simulating Five Insurance Levels 
Using Portfolios for Ranchers in Andrews County Grid ID 35781
Insurance 70% Insurance 75% Insurance 80% Insurance 85% Insurance 90%
Mean ($/acre) 0.91 1.04 1.07 1.19 1.20
StDev ($/acre) 1.54 1.68 1.82 1.96 2.10
CV (%) 168.50 161.69 170.06 165.13 174.93
Min ($/acre) -0.76 -0.87 -1.08 -1.20 -1.45
Max ($/acre) 5.26 5.60 5.84 6.16 6.35
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policies which are unlike the previous cases. The red area shows the probabilities that 
the net benefits fall below zero; the yellow areas show the probabilities that the net 
benefits will fall between 0 and $1.04 per acre; and the green area shows the probability 
that the net benefit will be greater than $1.04 per acre. As we expected, since the region 
is dry, the probabilities of earning net indemnities logically should be higher. On the 
other hand, since the premium rate is very high, it might offset the possibility of the 
indemnity exceeding the premium rate. However the StopLight chart illustrates that at 
85% and 90% insurance coverage levels, there is a 67% probability of receiving 
indemnity payments which will exceed the $1.04/acre level. The probability is much 
higher for that region and the interesting fact is that, the decision maker might be 
somehow indifferent between choosing 85% and 90% insurance coverage levels. 
Similarly there is no difference between 75% and 80% coverage levels. Both coverage 
levels yield the same (65%) probability of earning indemnity payments which will 
exceed $1.04/acre. For the 70% insurance coverage level, the probability of earning 
positive net returns is 63%, which is still much higher than indemnities that could be 
obtained at maximum coverage levels in other studied areas.    
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Figure 6.17. StopLight chart summarizing the probabilities of net returns to range insurance for 
ranchers in Andrews County Grid ID 35781. Red light shows the probabilities that net return falls 
below zero; the yellow areas show the probabilities that the net return for an insurance level will fall 
between 0 and $1.04 per acre; and the green area shows the probabilities that the net return will be 
greater than $1.04 per acre 
 
 
            Figures 6.18 and 6.19 show the SERF and the SDRF ranking methods applied to 
the simulated data for the insurance coverage level scenarios. Both utility based rankings 
systems ranked insurance policy 5 – the 90 percent coverage level — as the most 
preferred one. 
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Figure 6.18. SERF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in Andrews County 
Grid ID 35781 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.19. SDRF ranking of five range insurance policies for ranchers in Andrews County  
Grid ID 35781 
  
Lower RAC 0 Upper RAC 0.00147
Name Level of Preference Name Level of Preference
1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred 1 Insurance 90% Most Preferred
2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred 2 Insurance 85% 2nd Most Preferred
3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred 3 Insurance 80% 3rd Most Preferred
4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred 4 Insurance 75% 4th Most Preferred
5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred 5 Insurance 70% Least Preferred
Note: RAC stands for Risk Aversion Coefficient and SDRF for Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function.
Efficient Set Based on SDRF at Efficient Set Based on SDRF at
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7. SUMMARY 
 
            The purpose of this research was to estimate the economic benefits of PRF-RI 
insurance in four counties of Texas. Probabilities of net indemnities were estimated 
under different types of coverage levels and index intervals.  Monte Carlo simulation 
was applied and stochastic payouts were calculated for different insurance policies. 
SERF, SDRF, and StopLight Chart ranking methodologies were applied to rank 
insurance options for risk-averse ranchers. Four counties were analyzed: Bexar, Nueces, 
Henrietta, and Clay. One Grid ID was studied in each county.  
            In South San Antonio, Grid ID 39650 the fifth and sixth index intervals were 
ranked as the most preferred months to purchase insurance. The net return was simulated 
for five alternative insurance coverage levels, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, and 90% using the 
stochastic index values for the fifth and sixth index intervals. At the 70% coverage level, 
the maximum amount that the rancher can lose is $1.04 per acre, the average net 
indemnity is $1.33 per acre, and the maximum net indemnity per acre the rancher can 
receive is $10.76. At the higher coverage levels, the maximum net indemnity increased. 
For the 90% coverage level, PRF-RI insurance has the possibility of losing $2.26 per 
acre, gaining as much as $13.48 per acre, and the average net payoff is $1.98 per acre. 
At the 70% coverage level, the probability that the producer will get net indemnities is 
50%. However at 90% coverage level the probability of earning net indemnities 
increases to 59%. The SERF and the SDRF ranking methods ranked the 90% coverage 
level as the most preferred followed by: 85%, 80%, 75%, and 70%.  
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            In Robstown, Grid ID 41580 the first and sixth index intervals were ranked as the 
most preferred months to insure. At the 70% coverage level the maximum amount that 
the rancher can lose is $0.77 per acre, the largest net indemnity per acre the rancher can 
receive under the 70% coverage level is $7.27, and the average net indemnity is $0.94 
per acre. For the 90% coverage level, the greatest lose is $1.61 per acre, the largest net 
indemnity is $9.12 per acre, and the average net payoff is $1.38 per acre. For the 70% 
coverage level, the probability of earning net indemnities is 53%. At the 90% insurance 
level, the probability of receiving net payoffs is 60%. The SERF and the SDRF ranking 
systems ranked the 90% coverage level as the most preferred followed by: 85%, 80%, 
75%, and 70%.  
            In Henrietta, Grid ID 33873the fifth and sixth index intervals were ranked as the 
most preferred alternative. At 70% insurance coverage level, the maximum amount of 
lose is $0.55 per acre, the highest net indemnity that can be earned for the same 
insurance coverage is $5.24 per acre, and the average net return is $0.62 per acre. At 
higher insurance coverage levels payoffs increase. At the 90% coverage level, the 
maximum amount that can be lost is $1.17 per acre, the largest net payoff is as much as 
$6.91 per acre, and the average net indemnity is $0.98 per acre. For the 70% and 75% 
insurance coverage levels, the probabilities of earning net indemnities are 49% and 50% 
respectively. At the 85% and 90% insurance coverage levels, the probabilities of earning 
net indemnities are 54% and 55%. The SERF and the SDRF ranking systems ranked the 
90% coverage level as the most preferred followed by: 85%, 80%, 75%, and 70%.  
            In Andrews, County Grid ID 35781, the first and sixth index intervals were 
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ranked as the most preferred. At the 70% coverage insurance level, the maximum net 
lose is $0.76 per acre, the highest net indemnity that can be earned for the same 
insurance coverage level is $5.26 per acre and the average net indemnity is $0.91 per 
acre. For the 90% insurance coverage level the largest amount that can be lost is $1.45 
per acre, the average net indemnity is $1.20 per acre, and the maximum net indemnity 
that can be earned is $6.34 per acre. For the 70% insurance coverage level, the 
probability of earning positive net payoffs is 63%. At the 85% and 90% coverage levels 
the probability of earning net indemnities is 67%. The SERF and the SDRF ranking 
systems ranked the 90% coverage level as the most preferred followed by: 85%, 80%, 
75%, and 70%. 
            These results have implications for risk averse ranchers who are considering 
purchasing PRF-RI insurance. The results indicated that for all regions tested, the best 
alternative when purchasing PRF-RI was to buy the 90% coverage level. Probabilities of 
earning net indemnities decreased at lower coverage levels. All four top ranked 
portfolios have the sixth index interval in common. Implying that, December-January is 
a critical time period that should be taken into consideration by the ranchers.  
            The results indicated also that insurance returns depend on the region where the 
policy is purchased. In Southern and Eastern parts of Texas net indemnities appeared to 
be significantly less and have lower probabilities of being positive than in West Texas. 
Ranchers from West Texas may be able to significantly benefit from the insurance.  
            The best method for ranking scenarios is largely dependent upon the situation 
and the individual decision maker. Ranking the alternative scenarios using more than 
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one method is beneficial as it provides the decision maker with more resources for 
making a better decision. However these results from the simulations should not be 
interpreted as the best alternative for all ranchers. Each rancher is individual and 
equipped with varying levels of experience, assets and liabilities, as well as risk and 
income preferences. The results of the simulation are intended to help ranchers make a 
better decision on the consequences of the various insurance policies presented.  
            Further research is strongly recommended since only four counties were 
analyzed and one Grid ID was studied in each county. Because there are many counties 
in Texas eligible for PRF-RI and each county has several Grid IDs, expanding the 
research to other areas would be beneficial. The model showed that one index interval in 
Andrews County had high probabilities of earning net payoffs, however Andrews 
County contains twelve Grid IDs and the results in each Grid ID might be different. 
Besides West Texas has other relatively dry regions which could be analyzed to fully 
capture the viability of the rainfall insurance in those areas. Even though Texas has some 
areas where insurance looks beneficial, PRF-RI insurance is launched in seventeen other 
states. Expanding the research to other states would offer an opportunity to test the 
feasibility of PRF-RI insurance under alternative climatic conditions. 
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